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results suggest the existence of a demand for extreme, sincere beliefs that was unresponsive to experimental
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Religion has shaped human cognition and social relations since the origin of civilization
(Durkheim 1915); it has also undergirded power structures before modern institutions such
as markets, firms, or professionalized government came into existence (Finer 1997). In
present times, large shares of the population worldwide continue to report religion to be a
vital element of everyday life.1 Religion has been linked to growth and development (Barro
and McCleary 2003; Kuran 1997), policy preferences (Scheve and Stasavage 2006; Huber and
Stanig 2011), and a variety of different behaviors and life outcomes.2 Therefore, economists
have developed a field to understand the “production” of religion and the substantial material
activity associated with it. This field has focused much attention on the supply side of the
market for religion, such as the industrial organization of religious activity. Iannaccone
(1998) surveys that literature and argues that the demand side, linked to the nature of
religious beliefs, has received less attention. This paper investigates what is presumably a
key driver of the demand side of religion, namely faith (i.e., religious beliefs), through a
simple model and a field experiment.
Understanding faith is important, since it is arguably the more distinctive element in the
market for religion. The nature of religious attachments might affect market adjustments to
shocks in income or new scientific knowledge, as well as how religion interacts with modern
institutions. Additional important questions, such as whether faith drives religious activity,
or conversely, whether religious activity drives beliefs, also require an understanding of faith.
Unfortunately, faith has not received much attention in economics, most likely because its
study poses the great empirical hurdle of ascertaining religious beliefs reliably. Religious
beliefs typically involve propositions that are non-falsifiable, making it difficult to incentivize
the revelation of those beliefs. Without any incentives, social pressures to conform may
induce people to exaggerate (or downplay) their faith to peers or surveyors. Furthermore,
“revealed preference” approaches are also flawed: social returns may drive participation
in religious activities above and beyond what strict belief would warrant.3 Despite the
long history of religion in human affairs, to our knowledge religious beliefs have never been
1In the case of the United States, a 2008 Gallup poll showed that 65% of respondents consider religion
to be important in their everyday life. In 2011 Gallup reported that over 90% of Americans believe in God,
and 73% believe with absolute certainty.
2See Iannaccone (1998) for an excellent review of this evidence. There is also a body of empirical evidence
on religion from laboratory experiments; see Hoffman (2012) for a review. More recently, it has been shown
that religiously motivated activities can shape social attitudes, such as tolerance (Clingingsmith, Khwaja,
and Kremer 2009).
3Kuran (1983) elaborates on the fact that pressures to conform may lead to a falsification of preferences.
Huber (2005) investigates the cross-national determinants of the wedge between religiosity (as beliefs) and
religious participation (as an external activity).
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measured scientifically. As a result, a complete foundation for the study of the demand side
of religion seems out of reach.
In this paper we propose an approach to measuring religious beliefs—their sincere level
and elasticity—that can serve as a basis for a systematic study of the demand side of religion.
The key requirement is to locate religious propositions that are (presumably) believed in, and
are also falsifiable. Then we can rely on standard belief elicitation techniques that reward
predictions based on their accuracy. In addition, we can experimentally manipulate the cost
of holding different beliefs. We demonstrate our approach using the well publicized prophecy
made by Harold Camping, an elderly Christian radio talkshow host, who held that May 21st,
2011 would be the “End of the World.” On May 21st, the prophecy went, the biblical Rapture
would occur: divine judgment would be passed and the “saved” would ascend to Heaven to
meet God, while great cataclysms would ravage the Earth. The “non-saved” would suffer
“Hell on Earth” for five months, until all of creation would be annihilated on October 21st,
2011. Camping’s prediction attracted a world-wide following, driven by tens of millions of
advertising dollars and daily discussion on his Family Radio network, one of the largest
Christian broadcasting networks in the U.S.
We elicited beliefs in the End of the World prophecy by running a time-preference exper-
iment in the weeks prior to May 21st. The experiment embodied an elicitation mechanism
exploiting a key aspect of the beliefs espoused by Family Radio followers, namely that money
would have no value after May 21st: money would be worthless either if one was raptured
to Heaven or was left to suffer Hell on Earth. Thus, Family Radio followers should dis-
count money payable after May 21st to reflect their belief that the prophecy would come
to pass in addition to a pure time preference.4 In order to approximate a control group we
also approached members of the Seventh Day Adventist Church (henceforth, SDA), who are
theologically similar to the Family Radio members but, crucially for us, did not consider
May 21st a special date.5 We offered both the Family Radio and the SDA subjects a choice
between $5 “today” (that is, before May 21st), and a variety of amounts up to $500 four
weeks in the future (after May 21st), using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (Becker, DeGroot,
and Marschak (1964), henceforth, BDM) method to capture the exact amount payable post
May 21st that would make the subject indifferent with $5 today. For the control group,
4In fact, there were numerous media reports about believers in the prophecy making material decisions
in anticipation of the events of May 21st, such as spending down bank accounts or winding down businesses.
Several subjects told us they were making similar decisions, both informally and through a survey we
implemented a posteriori of the experimental interaction.
5Seventh Day Adventists are a large Christian denomination (16.3 million members worldwide, and the
7th largest denomination in United States) who believe that Jesus Christ’s return to Earth is “imminent,”
yet accept that “no man shall know” (Matthew 24:36 ) the exact date. Seventh Day Adventist member
statistics are available at www.adventist.org/world-church/facts-and-figures/index.html.
3
we expected a discount rate that exclusively reflects a pure time preference. If beliefs in
the prophecy among Family Radio members are a matter of external profession rather than
inner conviction, we would expect their choices to resemble those in the control group. If
their beliefs were sincere, we would expect their revealed discount rates to be higher. We
also varied the probability of implementation of the mechanism within the groups to affect
the cost of beliefs and to see if beliefs are price-sensitive.
The evidence indicates that the vast majority of Family Radio members held extreme
beliefs even in the face of direct financial costs—nearly all Family Radio subjects preferred
$5 dollars today to any amount up to $500 payable after the Rapture, regardless of the
probability of implementation. At the same time, the SDA members made choices consistent
with time preference parameters estimated in laboratory studies (Frederick, Loewenstein, and
O’Donoghue 2002). Taken together, these findings indicate that the Family Radio members
held sincere and full beliefs in the prophecy, with little apparent elasticity. This finding
underscores the role of sincere faith in the demand side of religion, and simultaneously
rules out two alternatives: evidence-based beliefs, and faith-related activities that occur
exclusively due to social factors.
Our experiment and theoretical model were designed to meet important conceptual chal-
lenges facing an economics approach to faith. The main difficulty is that traditional economic
theories conceptualize beliefs as driven by evidence, yet faith is defined as beliefs that are not
backed by evidence.6 We remain committed to an economics approach in that we investigate
faith as beliefs that, although driven by choice rather than evidence, are still compatible
with a rational management of material and psychological tradeoffs. In this spirit, a natural
starting point is the best known argument for a rational choice to believe, namely Pascal’s
wager (Pascal 1668). Pascal offered a clear decision-theoretic argument for “beliefs as in-
surance”: in the case that God exists, belief in him will be greatly rewarded; in the case
that God does not exist, belief in him will not hurt, so it is optimal to believe.7 We refine
Pascal’s logic by clearly separating actions from beliefs, dispensing with infinite Heavenly
payoffs, and integrating the logic of the wager into an intertemporal choice problem, which
allows us to define the notion of a demand for beliefs as the holding of beliefs that stem from
choice, not information. The model makes it clear that when beliefs are held over states of
6According to the Oxford dictionary, faith is “a strong belief in God or in the doctrines of a religion,
based on spiritual apprehension rather than proof.” See Montgomery (1996) for a discussion of some of the
challenges to an economics approach to faith.
7As it turns out, Pascal offered three arguments, not one, anticipating possible objections. To the most
well-known dominance argument, he added two expected value arguments which allow mistaken beliefs to
carry a penalty (Hacking 1972). In order to justify belief by those who are initially strong skeptics Pascal
invoked infinite payoffs from Heaven.
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the world that are verifiable, rewards for accurate predictions are possible, and beliefs can be
elicited. Our finding that Family Radio members truly believed in the prophecy establishes
the existence of a demand for beliefs.
In the model, agents have different prior beliefs on the truth of a religious prediction
about the physical world and can choose what posterior beliefs to hold. The benefit of
manipulating beliefs is that under a doctrine of “salvation through belief,” beliefs can add to
expected utility at the cost of inducing distorted actions (relative to the action that would be
taken under the prior belief); the model predicts the existence of a marginal individual who
separates believers from skeptics. Believers concentrate their posteriors on a full religious
belief while skeptics retain their priors. One takeaway from the model is that a purely
rational argument can drive a gulf between extreme believers and skeptics—something that
we see in the data. The marginal member determines the size of the “aggregate demand for
beliefs,” and being indifferent, she would choose to remain a skeptic if the price of beliefs
went up, while those with inframarginal priors should still choose to believe fully. This
finding prompted our experimental design of randomly assigning a high or a low chance
that the cutoff choice in the BDM scheme would be implemented, which changes the cost
of manipulating posterior beliefs away from the prior. We found that the choices of the
Family Radio subjects were not statistically significant across the two conditions, which is
compatible with there being no marginal members in the sample.
Our primary contribution of developing and implementing an approach for the elicita-
tion of sincere religious beliefs is not dependent on the origin of those beliefs. However,
our conceptualization of a demand for beliefs as an active choice, and the expectation that
beliefs may be price-elastic, prompt the observation that religious beliefs may reflect other
mechanisms. These range from pathology to the unwillingness to consider information con-
tradicting beliefs inculcated in early age or received from a trusted authority figure. This
would be in line with the cognitive dissonance literature (e.g., Festinger (1957), Akerlof and
Dickens (1982)). In response to these possibilities, it is worth noting that, as we will discuss
in our next section, scholars researching apocalyptic ideas have long emphasized that beliefs
in such prophecies are common in history and cannot be attributed to pathology. Rather,
they share important tenets with religion more generally. In addition, our empirical setting
favors interpretting the demand for beliefs of the Family Radio members as an active choice.
The prophecy constituted a new prediction and thus beliefs in it could not have been incul-
cated in early age, it was disputed by most Christian authorities, and its associated group
displayed remarkably low social cohesion. In addition, belief in the prediction hinged on
choosing how to resolve scriptural ambiguities and contradictions in a way that is a matter
of choice. Thus, if there is an ideal empirical setting to study the role of a “decision to
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believe” in the demand for religion, ours comes very close to it.
An additional observation is that reports are common of people making material sacrifices
for the sake of their religiosity, so those acts must already reflect a “willingness to pay” for
religion. But it is important to rule out actions that may be taken for signaling purposes,
rather than out of inner conviction. What is unique to our approach is that we implemented
a mechanism for the truthful revelation of religious beliefs with two key features: the choices
made in the experiment were private, and the ensuing financial consequences were controlled
by the experimenters, and not a matter of anecdotal reports by third parties or by the
putative believers.
The plan for the paper is as follows. The next section offers background on Family Radio
and the historical context of apocalyptic ideas. Section 3 presents the model, Section 4
presents the experiment and results, and we reserve further discussion of related literature
for Section 5, as it will prove more fruitful to discuss it after we have established our results.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Family Radio and Camping’s May 21st 2011 prophecy
Family Radio (henceforth FR) is a Christian talk and music radio broadcasting network with
164 stations and relays in the United States as of May 2011.8 In 2007, FR was the 17th
largest owner of radio stations in the United States in terms of number of stations and had
assets well above the hundred million dollar mark.9 For nearly fifty years FR has broadcast a
program on weekdays called “Open Forum,” in which the station’s co-founder and president,
Harold Camping, answers listerners’ questions about the Bible.
In early 2005, Camping published a book called Time Has an End: A History of the World
11,013 B.C. to 2011 A.D. (Camping 2005), which contained purported biblical proofs that
the “Rapture”—an event in which a selected few are transported directly to Heaven—would
occur on May 21, 2011. On this date, Camping predicted that “great earthquakes will occur”
and those not Raptured “will exist [for 5 months] in a world of horror and chaos beyond
description” until October 21, 2011, when “God will completely destroy this creation and
all of the people.”
Camping’s evidence for this predicition largely relies on biblical exegesis and numerology.
8More information can be found at http://fsiforms.familyradio.org/stations/search.php
9This information as well as data on expenditures we refer to later is available through IRS 990 forms
that all charities are required to publicly disclose.
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For example, based upon verses in the Old Testament, Camping believed that the biblical
flood involving Noah occurred in 4990 BC of the Roman calendar. Then, taking a statement
in Genesis 7:4 (“Seven days from now I will send rain on the earth”) as a prediction about
the end of the world combined with a statement in Second Peter 3:8 (“A thousand years
are like a day”), Camping concluded that the end of the world would occur in 2011, some
7000 years after the flood. Camping used other Bible passages to narrow down his prediction
that Judgement Day would occur exactly 722,500 days from the date of Christ’s crucifix-
ion (April 1, 33), leading to the May 21, 2011 date. Camping repeatedly stated that there
is “no longer any question” about this date, and that “the Biblical evidence is too over-
whelming and specific to be wrong.”10 This certainty required resolving contradictions with
scriptural discouragements to engage in apocalyptic date-setting (most notably the state-
ment in Matthew 24:36 that “no man shall know”the exact date) and interpretting many
passages as metaphorically referring to the end of times, in a way that is ultimately a matter
of choice. Faced with the same arguments, many other Christians who share the apocalyptic
frame of mind, such as SDA members, gave more weight to alternate interpretations.
In addition to the radio program, FR promoted the Judgment Day prediction by spending
tens of millions of dollars to place 2000 billboards in over 40 countries and sending multiple
R.V. caravans across North America. Camping also held weekly Bible studies at the Alameda
Veteran’s Memorial Hall, near the station’s headquarters in Oakland, CA. By May of 2011,
the story of Camping’s prediction and his numerous followers was covered by many prominent
news outlets, including Time Magazine, New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles
Times, AP, and Reuters.
2.2 Are May 21 believers exceptional?
To some observers, definite beliefs about the end of the world appear so unwarranted that
they must reflect an unsound mind and therefore cannot reveal anything general about how
humans form beliefs. Our personal interactions with FR members yielded an impression
of overall normalcy. But perhaps more importantly, the history of apocalyptic ideas af-
fords reasons not to attribute apocalyptic beliefs, including those of Camping’s followers, to
pathology.
Apocalyptic ideas arose with the attempts of the first civilized groups to explain reality
through myth-making and religion. In fact, according to (Wagar (1982), p. 36), “Cultures
without terminal visions of some kind have in all probability never existed.” Interestingly,
10In 1992, Camping wrote 1994? (Camping 1992), a book in which he promoted September 6, 1994 as a
potential date for the Rapture; he did not express certainty in this book. However, according to Family Radio
literature, “important subsequent biblical information was not yet known, so this book was incomplete.”
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apocalyptic myths follow a similar pattern across cultures from the Judeo-Christian-Islamic
tradition to Persian Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, and Babylonian, Roman, and Greek tradi-
tions (Eliade 1954; Wagar 1982). A recurring theme involves the current world ending by a
divine intervention that unleashes great catastrophes (floods, fire, earthquakes), and which
punishes the sinful and rewards the virtuous.11
The Christian apocalyptic ideas derive from the Jewish eschatology (a part of theology
concerning the end of time), and they augment the idea of a Judgment Day with a physical
second coming of Christ that will eliminate sinners, save the just, and usher in the Millen-
nium. Scholars of modern apocalyptic movements emphasize the deep Christian apocalyptic
tradition; according to McGinn (1998), “Apocalyptic is the mother of all Christian theol-
ogy.” In this vein, these scholars argue against the stance that modern apocalyptic belief
reflects pathology. In Waiting for the Apocalypse Daniel Cohen writes:
The modern catastrophist often relies on dubious theories, mistranslations, or
simply misinterprets the evidence to suit his own beliefs. It would be a mistake,
however, to put down the modern catastrophist as a fraud, a fool or a madman.
Usually he is honest, intelligent, and quite sane—he is simply devoted to an
incorrect idea [...] driven by the desire to prove that the Bible or parts of it
are literally true, though he may not easily acknowledge or even understand the
emotional basis of his beliefs. (Cohen (1983), p. 72)
Along similar lines, Kyle writes that the members of the Millerite movement—perhaps
the quintessential American apocalyptic group whose members expected Judgment Day to
occur in 1843—were “quite sober and unmarked by fanaticism” even though they were
reported to be willing to make very costly financial decisions when approaching the crucial
dates of the prophecy (Kyle (1998), p. 90). Following the failed prediction, the Millerite
movement spawned different mass religious groups with membership in the millions in the
United States, all holding apocalyptic beliefs today, including the Seventh-Day Adventists
and Jehovah’s Witnesses (this is in addition to the large Mormon congregation, which arose
independently in the same generation and shares the apocalyptic tenets). The Jehova’s
Witnesses have believed in a series of Judgment Day dates since 1843, while as we stated
earlier, the SDA Church evolved as a branch that rejects date-setting.
11A particularly powerful and recurring narrative involves the biblical flood as an instance of divine
judgment and punishment. The story of Noah’s Ark is believed by many mainstream Christians, Jews and
Muslims, and accepted as a fairly uncontroversial part of the Bible (Genesis 6–9) and Quran (surahs Hud
and Al-Mu-minoon). Many Family Radio billboards used the phrase “Noah Knew,” alluding to the idea
that to “hear the call of God” provides salvation from disaster.
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The observations above suggest two main ideas. First, apocalyptic themes do not seem
to be a reflection of pathology. Rather, they are deeply lodged in the symbolic and narrative
structures with which large parts of the world population have come to organize their sense
of justice and history. Within that uniformity, we find groups of people who, given the
same information, are willing to engage in date-setting while others are not. A key element
appears to be the discretionary way in which scriptural ambiguities and contradictions are
resolved. This in turn indicates that apocalyptic belief is more a matter of choice than of
Bayesian necessity. Second, the FR movement is not unique, but rather another link in a
long chain of like movements.
3 Model
We now develop a model where individuals choose their religious beliefs. First we model
individual behavior in the absence of experimental interaction, and then we explicitly model
the way in which the experiment would help characterize religious beliefs. Our model is
tightly tailored to the case of the Rapture and the logic of the Pascalian wager. However, the
logic of the model extends directly to religious beliefs more generally, and it can accommodate
a richer set of psychological motives, such as anticipatory utility.12 That richer version of
the theory is available upon request.
3.1 Basic setup
3.1.1 Structure and payoffs
There are two periods, 1 and 2. In period 2, one of two states of nature will be realized: the
“status quo” or the “Rapture.” There is a continuum of agents characterized by their prior
belief pi that the status quo state will occur. Agents are initially endowed with m units of a
consumption good. The agent chooses an amount a to save for period 2, leaving m − a for
consumption in period 1. We assume that the agent’s utility from consuming c is u(c), with
u (.) satisfying u (0) = 0, u′ > 0, u′′ < 0,and u′(0) =∞.
The payoff in period 2 depends on the realized state of the world. If the status quo is
realized, the agent consumes savings a. Alternatively, if the Rapture is realized, the agent
receives no consumption (in line with the stated beliefs of the FR members), but receives a
12Such augmented version incorporates more fully the suggestions in Montgomery (1996) on the possible
ways forward for an economics-based conceptualization of faith. While a model including factors like antici-
patory utility and cognitive dissonance would add realism, here we stick with the most parsimonious version
that delivers the results of interest.
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spiritual payment Ur, which we discuss shortly. For simplicity, we assume that agents do not
discount consumption in period 2.
At the beginning of period 1 an agent has prior belief pi ∈ [0, 1] in the status quo.
Our setting contains two deviations from standard economic models. One is that the first
decision the agent gets to make is to choose a belief pˆi ∈ [0, 1] in the status quo. This choice
of belief will affect the agent’s payoff through two channels. First, chosen beliefs will affect
savings decisions, as we require that after choosing her belief, the agent’s saving decision be
consistent with the chosen belief pˆi.13 Second, and here we introduce the other nonstandard
feature of our setup, the chosen belief pˆi may “earn Heaven.” Specifically, we model the
spiritual payoff Ur as a function of chosen beliefs pˆi:
Ur(pˆi) =
{
ur ≥ 0 if pˆi = 0
0 otherwise
}
We make the payoff discontinuous to capture the beliefs of FR members (and many
religions) that salvation is conditional on full faith in the religious doctrine. The type of
discontinuity plays an important role in Pascal’s arguments and, according to Durkheim, it
is an empirically sound assumption, “The first article in every creed is the belief in salvation
by faith” (Durkheim (1915), p. 416). The assumption of this discontinuity is not neccessary
for our main results, but does make exposition more transparent.14
To summarize the timing, in period 1 the agent begins by choosing her beliefs pˆi, and
then she chooses her savings a. In period 2 the state of nature is realized and the agent
either consumes her savings or enjoys the spiritual payoff ur.
3.1.2 Rational faith
As we stated above, we require that the agent’s saving decision be consistent with the
chosen belief. Therefore, given a belief pˆi, the agent’s savings must maximize u (m− a) +
pˆiu (a) + (1− pˆi)Ur, yielding optimal savings a (pˆi) characterized by the first order condition
u′ (m− a) = pˆiu′ (a).
The agent chooses pˆi anticipating the implied savings function. It is straightforward to
show that the agent will either choose a belief of 0 (full faith) or pi (the agent’s prior). To
see this, note that if pˆi > 0, the agent will receive no spirtual payment in the Rapture state,
yielding expected utility u (m− a (pˆi)) +piu(a (pˆi)) + (1− pi)× 0. This function is maximized
13This follows the basic logic of the Pascalian wager, as well as more recent work relating belief choice to
psychological motives (e.g., Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and Brunnermeier and Parker (2005)).
14The qualitative results of inelasticity will hold with a continuously increasing function Ur(pi) if u(c) is
not “too concave” given the other parameters in the model.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of theoretical model results: Chosen belief (pi:on y-axis)
given prior beliefs (pi: on x-axis)
when the agent chooses the optimal savings given pi, which occurs by setting pˆi = pi, yielding
expected utility u (m− a (pi))+piu (a (pi))+(1− pi)×0. Therefore, if the agent chooses pˆi > 0,
it must be that pˆi = pi. It is possible that the agent will choose pˆi = 0 given the discontinuity
in the spiritual payoff function. Although the implied savings will be zero (leading to zero
consumption utility in the status quo state), the agent expects to receive a spiritual payment
in the Rapture state, yielding expected utility u (m) + piu (0) + (1− pi)ur.
Therefore, the agent’s decision (when pi > 0) can be summarized by the following program
(resolving indifference in favor of full faith in the Rapture):
Maxpˆi∈{0,pi} [u (m) + (1− pi)ur, u (m− a (pi)) + piu (a (pi))] (1)
We then establish:
Lemma 1 If ur > 0, then there exists a type pi
′ ∈ (0, 1) such that all types pi ≤ pi′ fully
believe in the Rapture and all types pi > pi′ remain skeptics (that is, they retain their priors).
Proof: See appendix.
The Figure 1 displays the profile of chosen beliefs given initial priors. This result captures
the tradeoff between full belief and following one’s prior. The benefit of full belief is the
spiritual payment in the Rapture state. The cost is a distortion of the optimal savings
decision (toward no savings). For an agent with a sufficiently low prior on the status quo,
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the benefit of adopting full religious belief is relatively high (because the prior suggests a high
probability that the spiritual payment will be realized) and the cost is relatively low (because
the prior suggests a low probability of savings consumption and the savings distortion is
small). As the prior rises, the benefit monotonically falls and the cost monotonically rises,
leading to an agent who is indifferent.
3.2 Modeling the experiment
Having formalized the basic driver of faith, we now enrich the model to explicitly consider
how our experimental setup can achieve two objectives. The first is to elicit chosen beliefs
and thus establish their sincerity. The second is to study whether changes in the cost of
holding beliefs decreases the numbers of those who “purchase” them at the cost of distorted
decisions, following the basic law of demand.
3.2.1 Elicitation mechanism and timing
As the timing with the experiment is more involved, it will prove practical to describe it while
detailing our elicitation mechanism. First, agents choose beliefs pˆi. They then choose a cutoff
k, expressing the lowest amount they would be willing to receive in period 2 in exchange
for an amount v1 > 0 today (in the experiment, v1 was equal to $5). A first random
draw determines if the experiment will be implemented, which occurs with probability q.
If the experiment is implemented, a second draw v2 ∈ [v1,∞) is taken from an atomless
distribution F (v2) with associated density f (v2) (in the experiment, v2 was drawn between
$5 and $500). If v2 ≤ k then the agent gets paid v1 in period 1. If v2 > k, then the agent
gets paid v2 in period 2. After the uncertainty of the experiment is resolved in period 1 the
agent chooses savings a.
As before, we require that the agent’s cutoff and savings decision be consistent with
the chosen belief. That is, the agent must choose each decision as if the true probability
of the status quo is pˆi. Note that the savings decision is now more complicated, as the
implementation of the experiment impacts the wealth of the agent in one of the periods.
To keep track of these eventualities, we denote optimal savings as a (pˆi, I1v1, I2v2), where Ii
is an indicator function equal to 1 if the experiment triggers a payment in period i. For
example, a (pˆi, 0, v2) denotes the optimal savings decision given that the agent will receive an
additional v2 in period 2.
We solve the model by working backwards. Note that neither the savings decision or the
cutoff choice can affect the spiritual payment, which is solely a function of pˆi.
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3.2.2 Savings Choices
The agent selects savings a consistent with beliefs pˆi and with the outcome of the experiment.
If the experiment is not implemented, the agent chooses savings a(pˆi, 0, 0) as in the basic
model above. If the experiment is implemented and v2 is below the chosen cutoff k(pˆi), the
agent must choose a(pˆi, v1, 0) to maximize perceived expected utility u (m+ v1 − a)+ pˆiu (a).
If the experiment is implemented and v2 ≥ k, the agent must choose a(pˆi, 0, v2) to maximize
perceived expected utility u (m− a) + pˆiu (a+ v2).
3.2.3 Cutoff Choices
The agent selects a cutoff k that is consistent with beliefs pˆi prior to the experiment. Note
that the cutoff only affects the agent’s utility if the experiment is implemented. In the case of
implementation, consistency requires that the agent’s choice of cutoff k maximize expected
utility as if the true probability of the status quo is pˆi, which is given by




[u (m− a (pˆi, 0, v2)) + pˆiu (a (pˆi, 0, v2) + v2)] f (v2) dv2
+(1− pˆi)Ur(pˆi)
(2)
The choice of cutoff k is entirely analogous to the choice in a typical BDM-style elicitation
mechanism. If the agent prefers to receive v1 in period 1 to some v
′′
2 in period 2, the agent
can choose a cutoff k above v′′2 to ensure that v1 is received instead of v
′′
2 if the second draw
is v′′2 . Alternatively, if the agent prefers v
′′
2 in period 2, the agent can choose a cutoff k below
v′′2 to ensure that v
′′
2 is received if the second draw is v
′′
2 . Therefore, the agent can choose
the cutoff point that makes her indifferent between receiving that amount in period 2 and
receiving v1 in period 1, and receive her prefered choice given any draw of v2.
Note that, for a chosen belief of pˆi = 0, equation (2) reduces to,
F (k) [u(m+ v1)] +
∫ ∞
k
[u (m)] f (v2) dv2 + ur, (3)
which makes clear that a full believer holding pˆi = 0 will want to expand k towards infinity.
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We now state:
Proposition 1 Consider q > 0.
a) (Truthful revelation.) The agent will choose the unique cutoff k∗ (pˆi) defined by the
following implicit equation: u (m+ v1 − a(pˆi, v1, 0)) + pˆiu(a(pˆi, v1, 0)) = u (m− a (pˆi, 0, k∗)) +
pˆiu(a (pˆi, 0, k∗) + k∗).




≤ 0 and ∂k∗
∂pˆi
< 0 if k(pˆi) > v.
c) (The demand for beliefs is detectable.) Full believers in the Rapture have an
infinite cutoff (i.e., as pˆi → 0 we have k∗ →∞).
d) (Cutoffs are a known linear function of beliefs under risk neutrality.) If
u(c) = c, k(pˆi) = v1
pˆi
for pˆi ∈ (0, 1].
e) (Cutoffs of the risk averse.) If u′′(c) < 0 and m > v1
pˆi




Part (a) tells us that the experiment elicits the true amount k∗ (pˆi) that, given beliefs pˆi,
makes individuals indifferent between k∗ (pˆi) payable in period 2 and v1 payable in period 1.
Part (b) tells us that for any concave and increasing function u (c), cutoffs fall with belief
in the status quo, and there is a one-to-one mapping between the chosen beliefs and the
chosen cutoff once the cutoff rises above v1. Part (c) suggests that an agents with full faith
in the Rapture will have an unbounded cutoff. Intuitively, if the agent has a chosen belief
that implies that the status quo will never occur, there is no consumption amount in period
2 that can compensate the agent for receiving v1 in period 1. In the special case of risk
neutrality, part (d) notes that the chosen cutoff is inversely proportional to pˆi by a factor
of 1
v1
, implying that beliefs can be directly inferred from the cutoff. Part (e) states that, if
individuals are risk averse, and have wealth larger than v1
pˆi
(or, concretely for our experiment,
larger than $500), then the implied belief in the Rapture by a given cutoff will be larger than
that by a risk neutral person. In other words, the beliefs we back out for a risk neutral
person will if anything underestimate faith by the risk averse.
3.2.4 Belief choices
Thus far we have established that chosen beliefs can be elicited, but have not yet shown
whether an experimental manipulation can induce changes in them. Now consider the prob-
lem of an agent who must choose her beliefs before the uncertainty in the experiment is
resolved, and thus must anticipate the current and future financial implications of her own
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behavior.15 Formally, the agent chooses pˆi to maximize:
(1− q) {u (m− a (pˆi)) + piu (a (pˆi))}+ (4)
+q
{




[u (m− a (pˆi, 0, v2)) + piu (a (pˆi, 0, v2) + v2)] f (v2) dv2
}
+ (1− pi)Ur(pˆi) (5)
As in the basic model, it is easy to show that the agent will either choose pˆi = pi or
pˆi = 0. As before, the agent might choose pˆi = 0 in order to receive a spiritual payment
in the state of the Rapture, even though this might distort savings decisions. However, if
a positive pˆi is chosen, the agent will not receive a spiritual payment and therefore desires
no distortions in the cutoff and savings decisions, leading to a choice of pˆi = pi. Given this
binary decision, we can now establish a result analogous to that in Lemma 1: there exists a
type pi′ that separates believers from skeptics. The primary addition is that the probability
of experimental implementation q affects the separating type.
Proposition 2 a) (Skeptics and believers.) If ur > 0, then there exists a type pi
′ (q) ∈
(0, 1) such that all types pi ≤ pi′ (q) choose to fully believe in the Rapture and all types
pi > pi′ (q) choose to remain skeptics (that is, they retain their priors).
b) (Short run elasticity of the demand for beliefs.) Consider q˜ > q. Then
pi′ (q˜) < pi′ (q).
Proof: See appendix.
The results preceding this proposition had established that our experimental intervention
would allow us to detect the presence of full believers in the Rapture and, more generally,
obtain cutoffs that track sincerely held beliefs without affecting the belief choice of skeptics.
The last proposition tells us that under our experimental intervention there still is a highest
type that chooses to believe in the Rapture and that the manipulation of the parameter
q (the probability that the BDM mechanism is implemented) should affect the measure of
types who find it optimal to choose a full belief, without affecting the choice of full belief by
those with inframarginal priors. The intuition is that an increase in the probability that the
experiment is implemented raises the implicit price of holding extreme beliefs. For someone
who chose to be a full believer but is close to the margin, an increase in price switches the
order of the payoffs from fully believing and remaining skeptical, prompting a switch to
15We model the savings decision as following the experimental intervention in order not to have our results
depend on an impossibility of subjects to make posterior adjustments in savings. A model that inverts the
timing of savings and participation in the experiment yields similar results.
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skepticism. In other words, part b) of the last proposition tells us that the experimental
manipulation can inform us on the short run elasticity of the aggregate demand for beliefs.16
Note that empirically identifying the elasticity of the demand for beliefs requires a sample
of people that contain types between the indifferent types pi′ (q) for each of the two values
of q that we used in the experiment. We return to this issue when presenting the empirical
results.
Before turning to the experiment, it is worth emphasizing the central aspect of the
mechanism we propose by reference to the model. As can be seen in the objective in (4),
the payment v2 looms as large as the agent’s beliefs pˆi make it. This is because conditional
on the experiment being implemented, the payment v2 will be forthcoming if and only the
period 2 comes to pass. This feature of our approach is crucial to eliciting true beliefs.
Apocalyptic beliefs are costly in the experiment only because these beliefs are defined over a
proposition that, come period 2, can be proved or disproved, triggering differential financial
consequences in each case.
4 The Experiment
We designed an experiment to elicit both beliefs in Harold Camping’s Judgment Day prophecy
that the “End of the World” would occur on May 21st, 2011, and to study the elasticity of
those beliefs to changes in the costs of holding them.
To elicit beliefs, we used the well known BDM method (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak
1964) to elicit the indifference point between money payable by check in four weeks (a
future date intentionally set post-May 21) and $5 payable by check immediately. As noted,
Camping’s theory implies—and FR members professed to believe—that money would be
useless after May 21st. Therefore, the higher the belief in the prophecy, the higher the
later payment required to maintain indifference. For example, a risk-neutral person with no
pure time preference and a 50% belief in the prophecy would require $10 post-May 21 to be
indifferent with $5 before May 21st, while the same person assigning an 80% probability to
the prophecy being true would require $25 post-May 21 instead. Thus, under the assumption
that pure time preference and risk aversion are constant across the FR and SDA groups, and
that the latter make choices driven by time preference only, we can estimate the beliefs held
by the FR members and determine if they match their non-incentivized belief declarations.
16We emphasize the short run aspect for the following reason. In our theory optimization is instantaneous
and any change in parameters prompts instantaneous adjustment. However, it is conceivable that psycho-
logical frictions (e.g., cognitive dissonance) may prevent instantaneous adjustment. Individuals may have to
be exposed to changes in perceived costs for some time before they adjust. Thus, it is possible that changes
in costs trigger changes in the long run even when the short run features less elastic responses.
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Before discussing the elicitation of the elasticity of the belief, it is useful to discuss how
beliefs might change with its “price.” In traditional economics, beliefs do not respond to
prices because beliefs are formed mechanically through Bayes rule given a prior and objective
signals about the environment. Our experiment, as framed by the model presented in Section
3, is premised on the idea that people optimally choose beliefs to balance costs and benefits.
A person might choose to believe in the Rapture because this is thought to earn salvation.
However, this belief will cause undersaving relative to what the prior probabilities would
warrant, which creates a cost in terms of expected utility. One can imagine that if the cost
in terms of suboptimal financial decisions becomes more likely, fewer individuals may decide
to forgo the full belief.
In order to experimentally vary the cost of suboptimal beliefs without changing the
monetary payoffs in the BDM scheme, we randomly assigned participants into two treatment
conditions which corresponded to different probabilities that the participant’s payment would
be tied to their decision in the BDM scheme. Specifically, participants were informed that
their decision elicited by the BDM method would be implemented with either a 6% or a 50%
probability: these probabilities were chosen in order to maximize the range of expected value
of future payments while staying within our experimental budget. This variation defined the
two treatment conditions in our experiment. Note that the cost to a participant of a chosen
belief increases with this probability, allowing us to test for a non-zero price elasticity of
belief.
The experiment was run with two distinct subject groups : FR members and SDA mem-
bers, which yields a 2x2 group-condition matrix.17 As discussed above, SDA members hold
beliefs similar to those of FR members concerning the existence of the Judgment Day and
the Rapture, except that SDA members do not claim to know the precise date. We use the
SDA sample to see whether otherwise similar people who hold a belief system that is almost
identical to that of the Camping followers apart from the specific date prediction tend to
have what we think would be “normal” money-time preferences. If this is the case, it would
alleviate concerns that results for the FR members are driven by an inability to understand
the experimental decision, or due to a lack of trust in us as experimenters to deliver on
promised future payments.
17Henceforth, the term group refers to FR or SDA subjects, and the term condition refers to the 50% or
the 6% treatment intensities.
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4.1 Subject recruitment
FR volunteers were solicited from outside a Bible study led by Harold Camping in a public
hall in Alameda, California, on two consecutive Sundays, May 8th and 15th, 2011. SDA vol-
unteers were solicited from the congregation of an SDA church in San Francisco, California,
on Saturday, May 14th, 2011 (SDA services are on Saturdays).18
For both groups, we set up a table outside the building where each group met, and
upon exit we asked people if they would like to participate in a survey concerning their
beliefs. Potential participants were informed that they would receive five dollars cash for
participating, that after the initial part of the survey they would get to make decisions that
could generate further earnings, then answer a final questionnaire, and that we would donate
three dollars to their organization for each completed survey.19
It is likely that our recruitment method induced some selection with both groups. First,
we likely faced the standard experimental selection problem: the higher a person’s valuation
of time, the less likely participation is. Second, some members from both groups told us
they thought participating seemed too much like gambling, or was a form of work which,
according to their beliefs, should not be done on the Sabbath (Sunday for FR members and
Saturday for SDA members). Those who refused to participate on these grounds are likely
to be stricter Christians than those that did participate, so selection seems to be against the
hardcore members of the group.
4.2 Participant instructions
Upon obtaining written consent, participants within each sample were randomly assigned
to one of two treatment conditions and given the appropriate decision packet.20 They were
informed that their answers would not be made public, nor would we collect personally
identifiable information. Furthermore, every effort was made to ensure that participants did
not talk among themselves and that they made all decisions privately.
Subjects answered (privately) two sets of questions, one before and one after the decision-
making segment of the experiment. The first set asked participants general questions about
faith and whether/how the participant had heard about the prediction that May 21st, 2011
18We chose to administer the survey to the San Francisco SDA congregation because they were the nearest
SDA Church to the Family Radio Bible study that responded to our request to survey its members after a
service. We estimate that both the Family Radio Bible study meetings and the SDA service were attended
by about 100 adults each.
19The donation to the organization helped us garner approval from the organizers of each group.
20About half of the subjects declined to participate after reading the consent form. Decision packets for
the 50% treatment from both groups are included in the online appendix at faculty.nps.edu/jcunha/
research/faith_appendix.html; the 6% packet is identical up to the stated probability.
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would be the Judgment Day. The aim of these questions was twofold. First, we thought
beginning with a respectfully worded questionnaire focusing on faith would make subjects
feel more comfortable and facilitate a transition to the decision-making part of the study.
Second, we wanted to even out perceptions across both FR and SDA groups regarding the
potential nature of the study. The second set of questions, presented after the experiment,
concerned more directly beliefs on Judgment Day, decisions subjects may have made based
on this belief, and how they thought they would adjust their beliefs if May 21st passed
uneventfully. These more specific questions were asked after the decision-making part of the
study to avoid decision-making distortions stemming from a taste for consistency between
any specific answers given previously and incentivized behavior.
The packet informed participants that the decision-making part of the survey was to
proceed in three stages. First, they would be asked to make a decision between receiv-
ing $5 dollars today and different amounts of money in four weeks, and that this decision
would only be implemented with a particular probability (6% or 50% as indicated by their
treatment condition).21 Second, the researchers would flip a coin or coins (one coin for the
50% probability condition or four coins for the 6% probability condition) to determine if
their decision in the first stage would be played. Finally, if the coin(s) came up heads,
the researchers would determine the actual payoff as described below. Depending on the
participant’s previous decision, the subject was either written a present-dated check for five
dollars or a four-week-post-dated check for the payoff amount. This payment by check was
in addition to the 5 dollars paid in cash for participation. Payments took place in a removed
station. No visible differences in the form or procedure of payment took place across subjects
depending on their decisions.
We explained the BDM method in a simple fashion. Participants were presented with a
picture of 50 circles—-representing 50 small balls in bag—with a dollar amount associated
with each circle/ball ranging from $1 to $500.22,23 Figure 2 contains the diagram that was
included in the packet for the 6% condition.
We instructed subjects to circle all of the amounts they would prefer to have in four weeks
as opposed to $5 today. If they preferred $5 today instead of any of the amounts in four
weeks, they they were instructed to circle a box stating “I prefer $5 today.”As expected, some
21In addition to postdating the check and including the memo “Do not cash this check until [4 weeks
hence],” we instructed the bank to temporarily put a stop on the checks for four weeks, and informed
participants this had been done.
22Our initial setup had the 50 balls in a bingo cage. In the early stages of the experiment, it became clear
that some group members associated the bingo cage with gambling, an activity that both groups steadfastly
oppose. Therefore, we switched to placing the balls in a bag.
23Amounts less than $5 were included as a test to make sure participants understood the BDM method.
As we show below, no participant chose an amount less than or equal to $5.
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Now,	  it	  is	  time	  to	  fill	  out	  your	  answer	  below.	  	  
Again,	  feel	  free	  to	  ask	  a	  researcher	  if	  you	  are	  confused	  or	  have	  ANY	  questions.	  
Reminder:	  This	  decision	  will	  only	  count	  for	  real	  money	  if	  you	  make	  it	  to	  Stage	  3.	  
This	  will	  happen	  if	  the	  coin	  lands	  HEADS	  four	  times	  in	  a	  row	  in	  Stage	  2	  (which	  





Once	  you	  have	  circled	  your	  choices,	  please	  approach	  a	  
researcher	  so	  we	  can	  flip	  the	  coin	  for	  you.	  
I	  prefer	  $5	  today.	  
In	  4	  
weeks	  
Figure 2: Example of the decisio page of the questionnaire from the 6% condition. This
page was the same for both the Family Radio and SDA subject pools.
subjects did not immediately understand the BDM method and were thus helped by one of
the researchers. In these cases, we asked participants to imagine a ball with a particular
amount was selected and decide if they would rather “receive that amount in 4 weeks or
receive $5 today.” We refer to the smallest amount circled as the “cutoff”amount. If the
subject did not circle any amounts, we confirmed that they had a cutoff of greater than
$500. Conditional on choosing a $5 cutoff and having the random ball draw implemented,
the expected value of playing the game was $79.
4.3 Participant Overview and Summary Statistics
We surveyed 27 FR members and 29 SDA members. Of the 27 FR, four were excluded
before analyzing the data. We excluded a mother and daughter pair, as we observed the
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mother break protocol and approach the daughter to discuss the experiment; we excluded
two other subjects because they were merely observers, not Family Radio members.24 Thus,
our analytical sample contains 23 FR and 29 SDA subjects.
Table 1 contains summary statistics for both the FR (columns 1 and 2) and SDA (columns
3 and 4) samples, split by treatment group and condition. Columns 3 and 6 contain p-values
of tests of equality across treatment conditions. No observable characteristics are significantly
different across treatment groups, within samples. Note that some questions in Table 1 were
asked after the experimental intervention and therefore could have been influenced by the
treatment; however, given the benign nature of the experimental variation, along with the
fundamental importance of the post-experiment survey questions, we believe this type of
bias is unlikely to have occurred.
The first two rows of Table 1 show that subjects from both samples are of middle age and
slightly more than half are male. Table 1 also empirically confirms many of the claims we
have made thus far concerning the beliefs of Family Radio and SDA members. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the vast majority of Family Radio members stated that they believed Harold
Camping’s prophecy with certainty and had spent significant time “spreading the word.”
Very few SDA members believed that May 21st was the day of Judgment, despite the fact
that 80% had heard about Harold Camping’s prophecy. Figure 3 contains the empirical
distribution of these beliefs for both samples: the beliefs are extreme in that very few subjects
in either condition hold interior beliefs, in line with the theoretical predictions of our model.25
Subjects from both groups expressed uncertainty about whether they would be Raptured
on Judgment Day. This likely stems from scripture such as Revelation 14:3-4, which states
that only a small number of people (specifically, 144,000) will be Raptured, and Romans
3:10, which states that no man is righteous. Some subjects may have felt that expressing
certainty in one’s Rapture prospects was a violation of biblical authority, whereas others felt
comfortable doing so.
Overall, the summary statistics confirm that SDA members are similar in many respects
to FR members, but rather than having a date-specific Judgment Day belief, most believe it
will come at some unspecified time in the future (which is consistent with Church doctrine).
SDA members put positive probability on Judgment Day happening within their lifetime,
with an average of about 40% probability. This is further evidence that large, closer to
24It became apparent that the mother was a FR member, but did not speak English, while the daughter
was not a FR member and was simply there to accompany her mother. The non-Family Radio members
identified themselves to us as such after the experiment.
25Strictly speaking, our model does not predict that skeptics will have a zero belief in the Rapture, unless
we assume the piors for most people were indeed pi = 0. That is, that life would surely go on as usual after
May 21st.
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Figure 3: Histogram of stated beliefs in the prophecy, for both experimental samples.
mainstream, religious groups such as the SDA hold what many would consider “extreme”
beliefs. The question “What is life going to be like on Earth after Judgment Day?” yielded
strikingly similar responses from both samples, centering on destruction, chaos, and suffering.
4.4 Experimental Findings
Figure 4 contains the main results of the experiment. The histogram contains cutoff values—
that is, the minimum amount of money a subject was willing to accept in four weeks for $5
today—for each of the FR and SDA samples, separating the 6% and 50% conditions. The
FR and SDA groups have separated towards opposite extremes. The distributions of cutoffs
are statistically different across the two groups regardless of whether one separates the two
conditions or pools them. Panel A of Table 2 reports results by pooling the 6% and 50%
conditions. The p-value for a Wilcoxon Rank Sum test of different distributions of cutoffs
across the groups is less than 0.01. The table also shows that the average cutoff for SDA
subjects was about $20 and the median was $7. In other words, SDA members chose to delay
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Figure 4: Histogram of cutoff values by treatment condition, for both experimental samples.
payment for a “reasonable” time-discount. Thus, the median discount (+ storage) factor one
month out was 5/7 = 0.71, which lies within the range of values found by laboratory studies
(Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002). In contrast, FR members chose very large
cutoffs: only one subject chose a cutoff less than $500 (specifically, a $200 cutoff; the median
cutoff among FR subjects is $500, and the average $487).
What do the cutoffs chosen by FR members imply in terms of the strength of their
beliefs in the Rapture? We now make a simple calculation to provide a lower bound for
the strength of the implied beliefs. In the case of risk neutrality, the indifference condition
between a payment of $5 today and a payment of $v in a month time is 5 = δpv, where δ
is a pure time preference discount factor and 1 − p is the belief in the Rapture. We now
make two assumptions. One is that δ is common across groups and that the only driver
of differential cutoffs is a varying belief p. Next, we assume we can use the median SDA
discount factor, which matches previous estimates of time preference, to approximate the
common parameter δ. (This is conservative: note that if SDA cutoffs reflected some belief
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in the Rapture it would mean the SDA subjects are even more patient, which would lead
to even higher estimates of the belief in the Rapture held by FR members.) Thus, if we
take the median cutoff for the FR members (equal to $500), the implied lower bound on
the belief in the Rapture is 1 − p = 1 − 5
δV
= 98.6%. If we take the average cutoff for the
FR members (equal to $487), the implied lower bound for belief in the Rapture is virtually
identical: 98.56%. This is consistent with the unincentivized question in the survey, where
FR members expressed certainty about the Rapture.26
The fact that the cutoffs chosen by SDA members are compatible with previous estimates
of time preference provide reassurance that the cutoffs chosen by the FR members were not
an artifact, but instead that they do reflect strong and sincere beliefs in the May 21st
prophecy.
As made clear in Figure 4 is that there is no visible difference across conditions within
the Family Radio and the SDA groups. This is borne out in the statistical tests reported
in Panel B of Table 2. This table displays mean differences in cutoffs across conditions for
each group, as well as non-parametric p-values. There are no significant differences across
conditions for either group.
4.5 Discussion of Results
Our experiment is designed to detect different beliefs in the Rapture occurring within one
month of the date of the experiment. People with different beliefs about the likelihood of the
world continuing as usual will face different intertemporal tradeoffs and thus should select
different cutoffs k∗ when faced with the BDM mechanism. Indeed, the FR subjects, who
claimed to believe in the Rapture, selected very different cutoffs from the SDA subjects, who
did not claim to have strong beliefs on the May 21 date. By virtue of Proposition 1, the
fact that by choosing a cutoff of $500 the FR members forgo the possibility of earning up
to $500 dollars after the Rapture in exchange for $5 immediately suggests a discount rate
that is much higher than that of SDA members. Such a discount rate is compatible with a
sincere, full belief in the Rapture and the bunching of beliefs at an extreme is compatible
with the Pascalian wager logic of the model. Given the recency of the FR message and the
similarity of FR and SDA subjects in their general theological makeup, the concentration of
FR subjects on full beliefs in the Rapture is hardly attributable to a preexisting bunching
in the priors in the FR subjects. In other words, a demand for beliefs appears to exist.
The fact that cutoffs are not significantly different across conditions for the SDA members
26As stated in part e) of Proposition 1, the beliefs in the Rapture computed for a risk neutral person are
a lower bound for the beliefs held if the person were risk averse.
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is compatible with the idea that they do not have a demand for beliefs in the Rapture—they
match the skeptics in our model, who do not respond to changes in the price of beliefs q. In
addition, we find no evidence of an elastic aggregate demand for beliefs as defined by changes
in the marginal believer. Evidence of elasticity would have required a significant fraction
(rather than just one person) of the FR group making choices compatible with more normal
discount rates in the 50% (high cost) condition. One explanation for the lack of evidence
of elasticity is just that the demand for beliefs is inelastic in the short run—internalizing a
new incentive structure may take time. Another explanation is that the small number of FR
subjects we encountered had priors relatively far away from the marginal type pi′ (q = 0.06),
and they behave exactly as the model predicts inframarginal types will, by maintaining their
full belief. Perhaps, detecting price effects would have required a larger sample, or larger
changes in q coupled with stronger incentives.
One drawback to this experiment is that we could not explore a larger range of prices. For
example, would true believers have been able to pass up $5000, $500,000, or $5,000,000 in
order to actively entertain the idea that the Judgment Day would not happen on May 21st?
IRB restrictions prevented us from using larger sums that could be considered coercive. In
addition, in attention to the possibility of preference falsification, going into the experiment
we considered the possibility that offering larger probabilities of drawing the highest balls
would make the experiment very costly to run.
4.6 Epilogue: Adjusting to the Prophecy Failure
We noted earlier that the vast majority of members of Family Radio reported that they
were a 100% certain that the Rapture would occur on May 21st, 2011. Their responses to
the incentivized time-preference experiment were consistent with this belief. However, the
Rapture did not occur on May 21st. How did they react?
After May 21st it became extremely difficult to directly contact Family Radio members.27
Fortunately, in addition to the large number of news reports following the event, many
members continued to participate in a online forum dedicated to the discussion of the May
21st prophecy. The message board was hosted on Yahoo! and was open to the public to
read, but required joining the group with moderator approval in order to post messages.28
We downloaded all 1538 message board posts one month before and one month after May
21, 2011, and instructed a research assistant to encode the message content in a quantitative
27Our protocol as approved by IRB required and assured anonymity, and therefore we could not recontact
FR members. To our knowledge, the group did not meet publicly after May 21.
28The forum, with all posted messages, is located at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/
TimeandJudgment_May212011/.
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format (such as noting quoted Bible verses, mentioned dates, subjective ranking of emtional
tone, etc.).
The initial prediction about the timing of the Rapture was very specific. According to
Harold Camping, the Rapture would begin in the first time zone to experience sunset on May
21st (UTC+12, which contains New Zealand) and travel around the world as the sun set
on different time zones. In the preceding days, the message board largely included messages
about faith, hope, and goodbyes to other members. The board was relatively quiet in the
few hours preceding and following the predicted starting time. A few hours after this time,
some members began to speculate about what was (or was not) happening. The messages
revealed an anxiety for resolution that would maintain the central tenets of the prophecy.
A manifestation of that sentiment involved posts putting forth alternative future dates for
the Rapture. The new dates tended to involve minimal amendments to the original theory,
typically predicting the Rapture to occur within one day of the posting. For example, two
hours after the originally predicted Rapture time, the moderator of the board posted a 6,600
word essay about a potential error in Camping’s interpretation of time, suggesting that the
Rapture would occur at Midnight in Jerusalem time. This theory was endorsed by eight
other posts in the next few hours. Immediately after that time passed, someone noted that
the previous theory had not taken Daylight Savings Time into account, potentially extending
the margin by another hour. Following the passing of each new predicted date, a new revision
was immediately suggested and the group coalesced on that date. This active revision of the
prediction with dates very close to May 21st continued until about the time Camping made
his announcement on May 23rd that “spiritual judgment” had occurred indeed.
It is interesting to note this re-setting of dates after a failed prophecy is in fact typical
for apocalyptic groups (Kyle 1998). For example, following the Millerites failed prophecy in
1843, a large faction of the group quickly converged on March 21, 1844 as a new date for the
End of the World, and when that date passed uneventfully, new dates in 1874, then 1878,
then 1881 were adopted by the leaders that would go on to form the Jehovah’s Witnesses.29
The FR members’ pattern of behavior of adjustments can be cast in terms of a demand
and supply of predictions and narratives. Given the failure of the original prediction, the
“consumers” in this market for apocalyptic predictions attempted the production of their own
predictions. This process lasted until the “official” supplier of such predictions—Camping,
in the FR case—produced a new one. This demand for predictions provides another sug-
gestion that individuals have a demand for beliefs, one that can only be exercised if there is
something—in this case a prediction—to believe in.
29The other main faction, which went on to become the Seventh Day Adventists, found scriptural evidence
against date setting but continues to believe Judgment Day is near.
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5 Related literature
Our paper relates to two main literatures, one on the economics of religion and another on
belief anomalies and manipulation. Religion has, of course, attracted vast attention in the
social sciences and we will not attempt a broad survey here. The literature on the supply
side of the market for religion is well surveyed by Iannaccone (1998). Here we will cover
work that more directly relates to the theme of the demand for religion.
Although the demand side of religion has received relatively less attention, progress has
been made in understanding the phenomenon of conversion. Ensminger (1997) relies on
a transactions costs approach to account for conversion patterns to Islam as a function
of the advantages of membership to trading networks. In a similar vein, Levy and Razin
(2011) model a context where conversion (real or apparent) confers signaling benefits toward
further social interaction. Compatible with that logic, economics fundamentals related to
geography and trade feature prominently in recent empirical work on adherence to Islam
(Michalopoulos, Naghavi, and Prarolo 2012). Empirically disentangling the causal links
between economic fundamentals, conversion motivated by direct economic interest versus
true beliefs, as well as the possibility that economic interest leads to the development of
sincere beliefs, requires an approach to measuring beliefs, which is what we provide.
Closer to our framework, Durkin and Greeley (1991) formalize the Pascalian wager and
take their model to the data. Both their theory and empirics equate beliefs to religious
participation.30,31 While valuable, that approach mixes two different elements, beliefs and
actions, with an unclear direction of causation between them. For example, Pascal argued
that beliefs probably cannot be chosen directly, but that through the adoption of outwardly
religious actions one would come to develop religious beliefs (Pascal (1668), p. 69). Whether
this proposition is true or the opposite holds (rather, beliefs drive religious activity) cannot
be empirically evaluated without an approach to the direct measurement of beliefs like the
one we propose.
A commonality among the above papers on the demand for religion is that they either
hinge on instrumental motives to be (or appear to be) religious or sidestep the issue of the
sincerity of faith. In contrast, we model explicitly the manipulation of beliefs by tracking
how they affect expected utility through separate channels: as probability weights in the
30A substantial literature in philosophy has examined both the logic and premises of the Pascalian wager
(e.g., Hacking (1972), Hajek (2003)), notably the assumption that the returns to belief are infinite in the
state that God exists.
31Palacios-Huerta and Santos (2004) study a demand for religion following a more distant approach–
they consider an evolutionary competitive argument for religious preferences based on reduced risk aversion
against uninsurable states.
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expected utility function and as arguments of a state-contingent utility function that gives
beliefs instrumental value.
This brings us to consider the literature on the manipulation of beliefs. One strand of
theoretical work has studied an individual’s incentive to manipulate the information she has
about herself for instrumental reasons such as improving performance through confidence or
to overcome self-control problems (see for instance Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), Be´nabou
and Tirole (2004), and Compte and Postlewaite (2004)). Another strand has examined
incentives to manipulate beliefs (about the self or about the environment) stemming from
intrinsic reasons, namely that individuals care about beliefs directly. For example, such
manipulation may be driven by anticipatory utility (see inter alia Brunnermeier and Parker
(2005), Ko¨szegi (2006), Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), and Dal Bo´ and Tervio (2008)).
Moving on to the empirics of distorted beliefs, we are not aware of experimental stud-
ies attempting to establish the presence of a “demand for beliefs,” although behavioral
economists have identified ways in which subjective beliefs depart from Bayesian posteriors.
Incentivized laboratory experiments have shown that subjects tend to give more weight to
materially self-serving information (Babcock and Loewenstein 1997; Babcock, Loewenstein,
Issacharoff, and Camerer 1995) and to positive (as compared to negative) information about
a quality they directly care about, such as intelligence or physical attractiveness (Eil and
Rao 2011; Mo¨bius, Niederle, Niehaus, and Rosenblatt 2010). These results are suggestive
of belief manipulation, but are also compatible with a hardwired processing bias toward the
positive.32 Other studies document overconfidence about personal attributes using unincen-
tivized surveys (Svenson 1981). Such departures, however, may be due to limitations in the
quality of available feedback (Benoit and Dubra 2011) and a multi-attribute signal space
(Santos-Pinto and Sobel 2005).
6 Conclusion
Understanding faith, that is, strong beliefs that are by definition not driven by evidence, is
an important pending assignment of the economics of religion, and it may yield insights into
decision-making more broadly. In this paper, we study the demand for beliefs through the
prism afforded by a recent apocalyptic movement which gave us the rare opportunity to use
standard experimental techniques to measure beliefs about a falsifiable religious proposition.
Specifically, we performed an incentivized, relatively high-stakes, time-preference experiment
relying on the members of Harold Camping’s Family Radio group, who expected Judgment
32For example, Balcetis and Dunning (2006) document biases occurring in visual perception with very
short (30-100ms) decision time frames.
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Day to occur on May 21st, 2011.
Our experiment is framed by a theoretical model that highlights how the experimental
approach elicits religious beliefs when these are defined over falsifiable propositions. While
our model is parsimonious and works on the logic of the Pascalian wager, it can be extended
to incorporate a richer set of psychological motives, such as those of anticipation. The key
aspect of the model is that it allows for consistent (i.e., rational) manipulation of beliefs once
these enter as arguments in some state-contingent utility. Our model predicts manipulation of
beliefs to full religious belief for a certain set of priors. It also explains how the experimental
intervention could both establish the presence of a demand for beliefs and yield estimates of
the elasticity of that demand.
The evidence indicates the existence of a sincere belief in the end of the world, which
rules out both evidence-based beliefs and that the Family Radio members external profession
of beliefs was being driven by exclusively social motives. In addition, our data suggests that
the beliefs are inelastic to changes in costs, although this result may be dependent on a small
sample size, or pertinent to the short run only. A clear line for future research is to apply
these experimental methods to other falsifiable religious statements (such as the effect of
prayer on sickness) with larger sample sizes and potentially larger incentives (for example,
our results might have been more enlightening with an upper payment higher than $500).
One might be concerned that studying decisions by members of an apocalyptic group can
say little about the formation of beliefs by other people. After all, those members choose to
hold a belief that is grossly unwarranted based on available evidence. But this may in fact
be a habit affecting all of us to varying degrees. A review of the historical record establishes
that apocalyptic themes are central to nearly all major world religions, which involve many
other articles of faith. And another interesting parallel can be drawn with the way in which
the Family Radio followers reacted to the failure of the prophecy. A large share of the
members admitted that secondary aspects of the prophecy, such as the precise date or the
visibility of Judgement could have been wrong, but that the central beliefs in the Judgment
and in God more generally were surely right. This is not dissimilar to Lakatos’ description
of how science might reasonably work, namely by creating a core of central propositions and
a protective belt of auxiliary predictions, which if disproven would not imply disproving the
core.
Thus, a promising area for future research involves the question of what are the standards
of proof that individuals are willing to accept to test their beliefs. Another avenue involves
further theory and empirics on the possible tradeoffs between beliefs and incentives. Lastly,
in light of our results, it would be important to enrich the market analysis of religion with
models where the demand side includes sincere faith as an active component.
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7 Appendix A: Theory
Proof of Lemma 1: Note that the payoff from choosing pˆi = pi and pˆi = 0 are the same if
pi = 0. Therefore, consider pi ∈ (0, 1]. Define Φ(pi) ≡ u (m− a (pi))+piu (a (pi)), the payoff to
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the agent from choosing pˆi = pi. Define Ψ(pi) ≡ u (m) + (1− pi)ur, the payoff from choosing
pˆi = 0. Note that both Φ(pi) and Ψ(pi) are continuous. Using the Envelope Theorem, it is
easy to see that Φ′(pi) = u(a (pi)), so Φ(pi) must be an increasing function. As Ψ′(pi) = −ur,





and Ψ(1) = u (m) and
Φ(pi) → u (m) and Ψ(pi) → u (m) + ur as pi → 0. Note that Ψ(pi) > Φ(pi) as pi → 0 and





> u(m) for any concave u(·). Thus, there exists a unique, interior
type pi′ ∈ (0, 1] such that Φ(pi′) = Ψ(pi′) and Φ(pi) > Ψ(pi) for pi > pi′ and Φ(pi) < Ψ(pi) for
pi < pi′. Therefore, all types with priors pi ≤ pi′ will choose to fully believe, while those with
priors above pi′ retain their priors.
Proof of Proposition 1:
a) Consider the first order condition of objective function in equation 2 with respect to k:
f (k) [u (m+ v1 − a (pˆi, v1, 0)) + pˆiu (a (pˆi, v1, 0))] = f (k) [u (m− a (pˆi, 0, k)) + pˆiu (a (pˆi, 0, k) + k)]
This leads directly to the result as f (k) cancels.
b) Showing the cutoff k∗ is decreasing in pˆi relies on the intuition that an individual with
a lower belief in the world continuing must demand more money in period 2 to remain
indifferent after a loss of money today. So, we will consider consider pˆi1 > pˆi2 and will
show that this implies that k(pˆi1) ≤ k(pˆi2). Recall that k ∈ [v1,∞). There are two
mutually exclusive and exhaustive situations that we will explore. In the first, we have
k(pˆi1) = v1. Then, k(pˆi1) ≤ k(pˆi2) follows trivially as v1 ≤ k(pˆi2) by definition. In the second,
we have k(pˆi1) > v1. We will show that this implies that
dk(pˆi)
dpˆi
< 0, noting this implies
that k(pˆi1) ≤ k(pˆi2). Differentiating the implicit function k∗ (pˆi) with respect to pˆi and using




u (a (pˆi, v1, 0))− u (a (pˆi, 0, k (pˆi)) + k (pˆi))
pˆiu′ (a (pˆi, 0, k (pˆi)) + k (pˆi))
.
As pˆiu′ (a (pˆi, 0, k (pˆi)) + k (pˆi)) > 0, dk
dpˆi
< 0 if and only if:
u (a (pˆi, v1, 0))− u (a (pˆi, 0, k (pˆi)) + k (pˆi)) < 0. (6)
To see this inequality is true, we will establish two claims. First we will prove claim (i),
namely that an individual with a cutoff k∗ > v1 must be saving very little (some amount
α < v1). Then we will show claim (ii), namely that such an individual will choose zero
savings a = 0 if the experiment delivers an amount v2 ≥ v1 in the second period. Those two
statements together will render the inequality in (6) equal to u (α) − u (k (pˆi1)) < 0, which
must be true since by assumption k (pˆi1) > v1 and from claim (i) α < v.
Claim (i): If k (pˆi1) > v1, then a(pˆi1, v, 0) < v1.
33
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that a(pˆi1, v1, 0) ≥ v1, and define φ ≡ a(pˆi1, v1, 0)−
v1 ≥ 0. Then the individual receiving v1 in the first period saves all of that amount and
potentially some additional amount φ of the original endowmentm. Recall the optimal saving
decision a(pˆi1, v1, 0) maximizes u (m+ v1 − a) + pˆi1u (a), or, equivalently, that φ maximizes
u (m− φ) + pˆi1u (φ+ v1). Now suppose a transfer v1 were promised for period 2, leading the
agent to choose a (pˆi1, 0, v1) to maximize u (m− a) + pˆi1u (a+ v1), which is identical to the
problem of choosing φ. Therefore, a (pˆi1, 0, v1) = φ. Thus, a(pˆi1, 0, v1) = a(pˆi1, v1, 0) − v1,
which implies that a(pˆi1, v1, 0) = a(pˆi1, 0, v1) + v1 and m− a(pˆi1, v1, 0) + v1 = m− a(pˆi1, 0, v1)
and so it must be that:
u (m− a(pˆi, v1, 0) + v1) + pˆiu(a(pˆi, v1, 0)) = u (m− a(pˆi, 0, v1)) + pˆiu(a(pˆi, 0, v1) + v1).
But then k(pˆi1) = v1 by the implicit equation that defines k in Proposition 1, yielding a
contradiction with the premise that k (pˆi1) > v1 and we must have that a(pˆi1, v, 0) < v1,
substantiating claim (i).
Claim (ii): a(pˆi, 0, x) = 0 for any x > v1.
Given the optimality of a, we know that u′(m− a(pˆi, v1, 0) + v1) = pˆiu′(a(pˆi, v1, 0)). Note
that u′(m) ≥ u′(m − a(pˆi, v1, 0) + v1) as v1 − a(pˆi, v1, 0) > 0 (from claim (i)), and that
pˆiu′(a(pˆi, v1, 0)) ≥ pˆiu′(x) as x > v1 > a(pˆi, v1, 0). By transitivity, u′(m) ≥ pˆiu′(x), and the
expression u(m− a(pˆi, 0, x)) +pˆiu(x+ a(pˆi, 0, x))) must be maximized at a(pˆi, 0, x) = 0.
Therefore, Equation 6 must be true and therefore dk(pˆi)
dpˆi
< 0 if k(pˆi1) > v1 and therefore
k(pˆi1) ≤ k(pˆi2) if k(pˆi1) > v1.
c) To show that k(pˆi) → ∞ as pˆi → 0, We will show that for any cutoff k, there exists
some belief  > 0 such that k∗(ε) > k. It is easy to show that savings must approach zero as
the probability of consumption in period 2 drops to zero: pˆi → 0⇒ a (pˆi, ·, ·)→ 0. Therefore,
as pˆi → 0, u (m− a (pˆi, 0, k)) + pˆiu(a (pˆi, 0, k) + k) → u (m) and u (m+ v1 − a(pˆi, v1, 0)) +
pˆiu(a(pˆi, v1, 0)) → u (m+ v1). Therefore, given the continuity of these functions, there
must exist an  such that u (m+ v1 − a(, v1, 0)) + u(a(, v1, 0)) > u
(





+ k). Note that for a given pˆi > 0, u (m− a (pˆi, 0, k)) + pˆiu(a (pˆi, 0, k) + k) is
monotonically increasing and unbounded in k. Therefore, there exists k∗(ε) > k such that
u (m+ v1 − a(, v1, 0)) + u(a(, v1, 0)) = u (m− a (, 0, k∗(ε))) + u(a (, 0, k∗(ε)) + k∗(ε)).
d) Consider u(c) = c and pˆi ∈ (0, 1]. Then a(pˆi, v, 0) = arg max { u (m+ v1 − a) + pˆiu(a)},
which is equal to arg max {m+ v1 − a+ pˆi · a)}, and a(pˆi, 0, k) = arg max {u (m− a) + pˆiu(a+ k)}
= arg max {m− a+ pˆi · (k + a)}. We now consider two cases. If pˆi = 1, the player is in-
different between all possible choices of a, and then k∗ = v
pˆi
= v as m + v − a + 1 · a =
m− a+ 1 · (v+ a) for any a. If pˆi ∈ (0, 1), a(pˆi, v1, 0) = 0 and a(pˆi, 0, k) = 0, yielding k∗ = v1pˆi
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as m+ v1 = m+ pˆi(k
∗) by the definition of k∗.
e) A risk averse person will have a lower belief in the status quo conditional on a given
cutoff if k∗ (pˆi) < v1
pˆi
. Using the fact that k∗ ≥ v implies a (pˆi, 0, k∗) = 0, the implicit equation
characterizing k∗ in part a) is u (m+ v − a (pˆi, v, 0)) + pˆiu (a (pˆi, v, 0)) = u (m) + pˆiu (k∗).
Writing a (pˆi, v, 0) = a for simplicity, that equation implies that what we need to prove
is that if v
pi
< m, then u(m + v − a) − u(m) < pi(u( v
pi






piu′(c)dc. Given a generic function
∫ x2
x1
f(x)dx, it is easy to see that
if f ′(x) < 0 then (x2 − x1)f(x2) <
∫ x2
x1




u′(c)dc < (v − a)u′(m) and also ∫ vpi
a





(v − a)u′(m) < (v − a)u′( v
pi




) (the first inequality follows from the fact that
u′(m) < u′( v
pi
) as m > v
pi
, and the second from the fact that v − a < ( v
pi






piu′(c)dc, completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2:
a) Note that the payoff from choosing pˆi = pi and pˆi = 0 are the same if pi = 0. Therefore,
consider pi ∈ (0, 1]. If choosing a full belief pˆi = 0, then k is unbounded and a is always 0.
Therefore, the agent receives
Ψ(pi, q) = (1− q)u (m) + qu (m+ v1) + (1− pi)ur, (7)
and if he keeps his prior, the agent gets the payoff in (4) evaluated at pˆi = pi:
Φ(pi, q) = (1− q) [u (m− a (pi, 0, 0)) + piu (a (pi, 0, 0))] (8)
+q
[




[u (m− a (pi, 0, v2)) + piu (a (pi, 0, v2) + v2)] f (v2) dv2
]
. (9)
Therefore, using (7) and (8), the agent chooses pˆi = 0 or pˆi = pi depending on the com-
parison of these payoffs. Note that both of these functions are continuous. Using the Envelope
Theorem, ∂Φ(pi,q)
∂pi
= (1−q)u(a (pi))+F (k (pi))u (a (pi, v1, 0))+
∫∞
k(pi)
[u (a (pi, 0, v2) + v2)] f (v2) dv2.
All of these components are positive, so Φ(pi, q) must be increasing in pi. As ∂Ψ(pi,q)
∂pi
= −ur,









[u (m− a (1, 0, v2)) + u (a (1, 0, v2) + v2)] f (v2) dv2
]
and Ψ(1, q) = (1− q)u (m)+qu (m+ v1).
As k(pi) → ∞ as pi → 0, note that Φ(pi, q) → (1 − q)u (m) + qu (m+ v1) and Ψ(pi, q) →
(1− q)u (m) + qu (m+ v1) + ur as pi → 0. Note that Ψ(pi, q) > Φ(pi, q) as pi → 0 for any q
and Ψ(1, q) < Φ(1, q) for any q (as (1− q) 2u (m
2
)
> (1− q)u (m) for any concave u(·) and
q(u (m− a (1, 0, v2)) + u (a (1, 0, v2) + v2)) > qu (m+ v1) by the definition of k). Thus, there
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exists a unique, interior type pi′(q) ∈ (0, 1] such that Φ(pi′, q) = Ψ(pi′, q) and Φ(pi, q) > Ψ(pi, q)
for pi > pi′(q) and Φ(pi, q) < Ψ(pi, q) for pi < pi′(q). Therefore, all types with priors pi ≤ pi′(q)
will choose to fully believe, while those with priors above pi′(q) retain their priors.
b) Now we analyze effect of q on the set of believers. Recall that pi′(q) is the type such that
Φ(pi′, q) = Ψ(pi′, q). Our goal is to show that ∂pi
′(q)
∂q





, as it then follows that an (small) increase from q1 to q2 increases the payoff from
skepticism faster than the payoff from full belief and therefore Φ(pi′(q1), q2) > Ψ(pi′(q1), q2)
and therefore pi′(q2) < pi′(q1), implying that
∂pi′(q)
∂q





proceed through six steps.
1. First, simply compute the two magnitudes:
∂Ψ(pi, q)
∂q








[u (m) + piu (v2)] f (v2) dv2
−[u (m− a (pi, 0, 0)) + piu (a (pi, 0, 0))].




> u (m+ v − a (pi, v, 0)) + piu (a (pi, v, 0))− u (m− a (pi))− piu (a (pi)) ≡ Y.
This follows from the fact that,{




[u (m) + piu (v2)] f (v2) dv2
}
> u (m+ v − a (pi, v, 0))+piu (a (pi, v, 0))
must hold from the definition of k (pi). Therefore, by transitivity, our proof would be complete
if we could show that Y > ∂Ψ(pi,q)
∂q
. The following four steps establish this inequality.
3. Let us rewrite Y as a sum of two terms,
Y = u (m+ v − a (pi, v, 0))− u (m− a (pi)) + pi [u (a (pi, v, 0))− u (a (pi))]
≡ Y ′ + pi [u (a (pi, v, 0))− u (a (pi))] ,
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where u (a (pi, v, 0)) − u (a (pi)) > 0 since u (a (pi, v, 0)) is increasing in v (savings increase
with initial endowment).
4. Note that from concavity and the fact that a (pi) > 0,
u (m+ v − a (pi))− u (m− a (pi)) > u (m+ v)− u (m) = ∂Ψ(pi, q)
∂q
.
Now adding and subtracting u (m+ v − a (pi, v, 0)) to the LHS of the latter inequality, we
get,
Z ≡ u (m+ v − a (pi, v, 0))+u (m+ v − a (pi))−u (m− a (pi))−u (m+ v − a (pi, v, 0)) > ∂Ψ(pi, q)
∂q
.
5. This step shows that u (m+ v − a (pi))−u (m+ v − a (pi, v, 0)) ≤ pi [u (a (pi, v, 0))− u (a (pi))].
To see this is true, simply rearrange it as
u (m+ v − a (pi)) + piu (a (pi)) ≤ u (m+ v − a (pi, v, 0)) + piu (a (pi, v, 0)) ,
where the sign of the inequality follows from optimality of a (pi, v, 0) in a situation where the
endowment is m+ v.
6. The fourth step is to note that Y ≥ Z,
Z = u (m+ v − a (pi, v, 0))− u (m− a (pi)) + u (m+ v − a (pi))− u (m+ v − a (pi, v, 0))
= Y ′ + u (m+ v − a (pi))− u (m+ v − a (pi, v, 0))
≤ Y ′ + pi [u (a (pi, v, 0))− u (a (pi))] = Y,
where the last inequality follows from using steps 3 and 5. Thus, invoking step 4, transitivity
yields Y ≥ Z > ∂Ψ(pi,q)
∂q
, which completes the proof.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for Family Radio and Seventh-day Adventist experimental
groups, by treatment.
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Table 2: Cutoff values for Family Radio and Seventh-day Adventist experimental groups, by
treatment.
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